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THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE
ARTS
KEVIN LIFTIG
1. Introduction
“From its beginning the law of copyright has developed
in response to significant changes in technology.” - Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens for the majority in Sony Corp v.
Universal City Studios
As digital storage of intellectual goods such as literature and music
has become widespread, the duplication and unlicensed distribution of
these goods has become a frequent source of legal contention. This
problem is nothing new. Throughout history, when technology for pro-
duction and replication of intellectual goods advanced, there were dis-
putes concerning the rights to produce and duplicate these works. As
new technologies have made copies of intellectual goods more accessi-
ble, legal institutions have largely moved to protect the rights of own-
ership of ideas through copyright laws. Institutions have also sought to
maintain incentives to create and distribute these works. While there
are a few historical instances of technology working to aid producers
such as anti-duplication methods, technological increases have largely
favored the consumer. Likewise, with relatively few exceptions legal
institutions have ruled in favor of the producer to expand the scope of
copyright protections.
Date: December 10, 2009.
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Intellectual goods are not physical books, recording, or files. Rather,
intellectual goods are the ideas and the work contained within the phys-
ical host. One individual’s copy of Harry Potter and the Chamber of
Secrets is not the intellectual good. All copies of Harry Potter and the
Chamber of Secrets contain the same intellectual good, which is the
ideas, plot, characters, and story arranged to form the whole work. Tra-
ditionally, intellectual goods have been viewed similarly to pure public
goods, so they are considered to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
A non-rivalrous good is a good for which the consumption of the good
by an individual does not diminish the availability of the good for oth-
ers to consume. For example, two individuals can be reading the same
book at the same time, but the fact that the book is being read by one
individual does not negatively impact the utility of the other individ-
ual. A non-excludable good is a good that it is impossible to prevent
any individual from consuming. Air is a purely non-excludable good
because it is impossible to prevent an individual from consuming air
(Raven 2005).
Intellectual goods are relatively non-excludable goods. An individual
may be excluded from the physical good that contains the intellectual
good, but once an intellectual good has been created it is difficult to
restrict its distribution. The legal institution of copyright is an at-
tempt to make intellectual goods more excludable and to make them
function less like public goods. The classic argument for this protection
is that without this protection, publishers would not receive income,
and would be unable to compensate authors for their work. This is
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the argument for strong copyright law with maximum excludability,
which is favorable to producers over consumers. However, the opposite
conclusion can just as easily be reached. Since intellectual goods are
inherently non-rivalrous and non-excludable, then a lack of copyright
protection does not change the natural state of the good, and it benefits
the public to allow each individual to possess all of the great intellec-
tual works for a very low price. In this line of argument the purpose
of copyright is to ensure the progress of science and the arts, whereas
weak copyright law would promote the dissemination of science and
art. Viewed in these terms, stronger copyright laws that increase the
excludability of intellectual goods sacrifice current availability of intel-
lectual goods to promote future availability by giving creators incentive
to generate more intellectual goods (Raven 2005).
Legal institutions have attempted to balance these viewpoints, to
create a system that both protects property rights, and promotes the
spread of knowledge. However, any balance that legal institutions cre-
ate is inherently temporary. New technologies have required copyright
law to be revisited and revised, time and time again. Each technological
advance in the field of duplication has disrupted the existing balance
and has required adjustment by legal institutions. New technology con-
tinually lowered costs of production and replication. As production and
replication costs fell, legal institutions expanded lengths of copyright
protects, and the types of goods covered by copyright laws.
The methods of conveying intellectual goods are dependent on tech-
nology available. Intellectual goods function as private goods rather
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than public goods when replication by individuals (other than the pro-
ducers) is very costly. As technology for replication improves, and the
cost to duplicate the good falls, preserving incentives to produce and
purchase the good in a market require an institution such as copyright
law (Adelstein 1985, 217).
Recently, challenges have been made to the traditional view of in-
tellectual goods as non-excludable, non-rival public goods. The tradi-
tional view holds that markets provide insufficient incentives to produce
intellectual goods, and that the institution of copyright exists to create
additional incentive to produce. However, the institution of copyright
creates a trade-off between incentive to produce and public access to
intellectual goods. The outcome can be balanced by copyright law, but
this approach necessitates that both access and incentive to produce
will never be optimal (Yoo, 2007, 2).
Christopher Yoo advocates a different approach to intellectual goods.
Rather than viewing non-excludability or non-rivalry as the defining
characteristics of public goods, Yoo returns to Paul Samuelson’s orig-
inal work on public goods. Samuelson focused on “the fact that the
same quantity of production can appear as an argument on more than
one person’s consumption function” (Yoo, 2007, 3). So each consumer
of the good consumes the entire output of the public good. This means
that consumers will all consume the same quantity of a public good,
but will signal their preferences by willingness to pay different prices.
Therefore optimal production must satisfy the “Samuelson Condition”,
which requires expanding the production of public goods as long as
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the aggregate marginal benefits derived from all consumers exceed the
marginal cost of increasing production. However, in this case, the equi-
librium is difficult to find because consumers preferences are expressed
through prices rather than quantities, so consumers do not reveal their
marginal valuations of the intellectual goods. In this system consumers
have incentive to understate value, so other customers will bear a larger
proportion first-copy costs (Yoo, 2007, 4).
By viewing the problem of copyright trade-offs in terms of satisfying
the Samuelson condition, Yoo’s paper hopes to change the parameters
of the problem, and to explore new solutions. Yoo suggests that intel-
lectual goods can vary by quality in addition to price and quantity. If
quality is variable, consumers may reveal a preference by changing their
purchasing habits to maximize quality. This could reveal consumer
preferences even when consumers are unable to reveal their preferences
through quantity and may be unwilling to do so through price (Yoo,
2007, 5-6). This approach could potentially determine whether mar-
kets can support optimal production and allocation of impure public
goods. However, even if an optimal solution exists that does not mean
it will be reached, or that legal institutions could take steps to ensure
the optimal solution is the outcome.
2. Publishing and Originality disputes in the Pre-Modern
world
Before the creation of copyright, intellectual goods found some mea-
sure of protection through the nature of the hosts in which they were
contained. Prior to the invention of written language epic poems or
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songs could be contained only within the memory of the creator and
those he taught it to. Poets, musicians, and storytellers could make a
living through recitation and had direct control over who accessed the
intellectual good. The consumer could access the good only through
interacting with the producer for the time it took to convey the intel-
lectual good. A personal interaction between producer and consumer
had to be ongoing, and the consumer could only experience the intel-
lectual good if the artist chose to share it, presumably in exchange for
some sort of compensation.
With the invention of written language, literary works and writ-
ten material could be set down in some physical host like stone, bone,
metal, skins, and eventually paper. The invention of a common musical
notation also allowed composers to record works of music in manuscript
form. In this period after written language but before the invention
of movable type, neither creators nor publishers of intellectual good
needed copyright protection. Demand was highest for works such as
Scripture, and classical Greek and Latin texts were all clearly in the
public domain. Living authors generally wrote either for the divine or
to create art for art’s sake and with no financial motivation. Further-
more, since all written works and manuscripts could only be copied by
hand, the process of creating an unauthorized copy of any work would
require a significant amount of access time to the original manuscript,
copying materials, and the effort of painstakingly copying the entirety
of the desired text by hand (Adelstein, 1985, 224).
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Despite the tremendous effort involved, there was at least one major
dispute over a hand-copy of a manuscript. Around the year 560 in
Ireland, Saint Columba was involved in a dispute with Saint Finnian
of Moville over a psalter, a volume containing the Book of Psalms.
Columba had copied the manuscript at a scriptorium run by Saint
Finnian. Columba had intended to keep the copy but Finnian disputed
this. Both agreed for Diarmaid son of Fearghus Ceirrbheoil, King of
Ireland, to give judgment. He ruled against Columba, stating that to
every cow belonged her calf and that to every book belonged a copy
of it (Annals of the Four Masters, 555 A.D.). This did not resolve the
dispute and it eventually escalated into the Battle of Cu´l Dreimhne in
which three thousand men died. Afterwards Columba exiled himself
and went on to found a monastery on Iona, a small island off the coast
of Scotland (Annals of the Four Masters, 557 A.D.).
3. The Formation of British Copyright Law
When William Caxton introduced the printing press to London in
1476, the informal system was no longer sufficient. As press technol-
ogy spread and the demand for books rose, a population of “book
pirates” emerged. These book pirates would purchase a copy of the
original printer’s book for the specific purpose of duplicating their own
printed versions of the work to sell to the public. Pirates had an ad-
vantage over original publishers because they did not have to bear the
original costs of production or assume risk in publishing works with
uncertain demand. As secondary producers, pirates could choose the
most popular and profitable works to pirate. As buyers of the original
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good, these secondary producers were often indistinguishable from ac-
tual readers, so the publishers could not prevent piracy by refusing to
sell to secondary producers. Even if they could identify and prevent
sale to pirates, they would not be able to prevent ordinary readers from
selling their copies secondhand to pirates (Adelstein, 1985, 224). This
reduced the incentive to produce original works or take any publishing
risks. In publishing, profits from successful books offset losses from un-
successful books. In this situation, profits from successful books went
to pirates who could produce cheaper copies because they did not have
to bear the cost of unsuccessful works. Since the original booksellers
had no way to recover losses, they appealed to the monarchy to create
some institution to allow them to combat piracy.
The British Crown began to grant letters patent that gave indi-
vidual printers monopoly privileges to print particular works. These
patents asserted property rights over intellectual goods distinct from
any physical property rights (Adelstein, 1985, 225). These rights did
not protect authorship or creation of intellectual goods, but focused
on the distributors, the printers. The Crown invested tremendous au-
thority in printers, giving the Stationer’s Company, a guild of London
printers, a charter granting them a monopoly on printing throughout
all of England, and police powers to suppress printers who violated
their monopoly. In addition, the guild became responsible for enforc-
ing any censorship the Crown desired. The Guild enforced censorship
by banning secondary production, ensuring that they had control over
all printing that occurred in the country and that others could not
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print objectionable material. While this change in the dynamics of the
industry once again created profits and gave printers incentive to oper-
ate, authors found themselves hurt by the power given to the printers
(Adelstein, 1985, 225). This was the first of many acts from a legal
institution that granted more power to producers in response to tech-
nology that allowed secondary duplication.
Throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century, patents pro-
tected three classes of books. The Crown issued patents to individuals
or groups to print specific works in what we would consider the public
domain, such as the Bible. Other patents were granted by topic; they
covered all books of a particular subject including those not yet written
and were again issued to printers. Some patents protected named works
with named authors. Often these patents covered only learned works
that involved an incredible amount of time and expense to compile.
One such example is a 1573 patent that gave an eight-year privilege
for Ludivick Lloyd to create an English translation of Plutarch’s Lives
(Feather, 1992, 456). Still, patent privileges covered very few books
among many. This system benefited the Stationers Guild. A 1583 in-
vestigation concludes, “stationers hath diuers copies seuerall to them-
selues w(ch) they enioye as fully as if they had the Quenes preuilege for
euerie of them” (Feather, 1992, 457). The stationers had tremendous
authority over copy protection and were using this power to expand
their influence further and effectively grant themselves copy privilege
over works not officially covered by their royal patents.
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The Monopolies Act of 1614 was intended to stop abuses of the
patent system in general, but specifically excluded “grants of privilege
heretofore made or hereafter to be made concerning printing”. This
showed the support that the printing industry had from the crown,
especially the Solicitor-General, Sir Thomas Coventry, who assured
James I that the Stationers mainly produced books that are ”not worth
of your majesties priuelege” and which ”the printing of them [has been]
settled already.” This referred to the practice of assigning rights to the
first publisher of any new book. In 1583 a commission reporting on
the Stationers described this practice, saying that all the stationers try
to purchase any book that they can get any learned man to make or
translate so that they can become the first printer of the book thus
gaining de facto copyright privilege (Feather, 1992, 458).
Although the Stationer’s Guild maintained its control of both print-
ing and censorship of written material, the balance of power within the
guild itself shifted. For the first ten or fifteen years that the Stationer’s
Guild held its charter, the printers controlled the guild and the book
trade. However, as press technology spread and more printers entered
the market, the balance of power shifted so that booksellers gained
dominance in the Guild, and by the 1580’s printers found their role
becoming paid agents of the copy owners (Feather, 1992, 463).
The Stationer’s Guild moved to incorporate patents from the older
system of individual copy protection, and gained exclusive rights to
print works such as the Bible, the Statutes and common law books.
However, these works were frequent targets of piracy. To combat this,
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Richard Day, who held a large number of patents including those on
many popular schoolbooks, made an arrangement with John Wolfe, one
of the larger book pirates. Day made Wolfe a shareholder in his group
of patents and expanded ownership of this patent group. The patent
group became so large that the owners delegated management to the
governing board of the Stationers Company. As the owners purchased
other patents to add to the group, people referred to this collection
of patents as the “English Stock” (Feather, 1992, 466). Members of
the Stationers Company bought shares; the profits made from publi-
cation of the works belonging to the Stock paid the dividends. Thus,
the Company controlled the various properties in the Stock, which had
formerly existed under the royal patent system. In this manner Day
was able to respond to Wolfe’s piracy without actually appealing to a
government institution allowing them to come to an unique and mutu-
ally beneficial arrangement, rather than have an arrangement enforced
by a legal institution.
A clear system of ownership of intellectual goods had been set forth,
but the Stationers Guild only allowed its members to register copies.
Entry into the Guild’s Register was the only acceptable proof of copy
ownership, so the Guild had absolute control of it. In theory, the
Monopolies Act of 1614 allowed anyone to own rights to a copy, but in
practice this only applied to rights granted by royal patent (Feather,
1992, 466). Although entry into the Register was only a record of
ownership and did not explicitly confer rights of ownership, generally
12 KEVIN LIFTIG
the first member of the Guild to enter his copy into the Register received
exclusive rights to publish the work in perpetuity (Stern, 2008, 72).
4. Copyright Legislation in England
A few cases of author’s rights did emerge. Under James I, the
Crown began to protect the author’s rights to some works of schol-
arship. James I used his power as king to grant author’s rights to
John Minsheu’s Glosson Etymologicon and John Marriott’s Pharmo-
coeia Londiniensis. There was a vague awareness of some author’s
rights, shown by the fact that many were compensated for their work;
however, since the Stationers controlled the system, sales of the work
were on the Stationers’ terms and most of the existing law protected
the first publishers from being outsold by pirated versions rather than
protecting the author’s original work (Feather, 1992, 472).
The 1662 Licensing Act broke with previous law by allowing reprints
of excerpts of books and pamphlets without permission from the copy
holder. The Licensing Act considered the book the actual property.
While the law did not permit complete duplication, there was no pro-
hibition against use of excerpts, scenes, characters, and style (Stern,
2008, 73). Renewal of the Licensing act met with opposition in the
1692-1693 parliaments. Opponents cited its lack of protection for au-
thor rights, as certain entries in the Stationers Register recorded rights
to persons other than those who had originally entered them, implying
corruption in the system. A member of the Stationer’s guild did testify
that “he found several leave rout out of the Register-book about the
date or time of the entry of most of the said copies” and “saw several
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of his copies entered again to other persons” (Stern, 2008, 73). The
opposition to renewal in the House of Lords stated that the Licensing
Act “subjects all Learning and true Information to the arbitrary will
and pleasure of a mercenary and perhaps ignorant Licenser, destroys
the properties of authors in the copies; and sets up many monopolies.”
The Act was still renewed, but its renewal period was shortened to only
a year and a session, so it would be reexamined by Parliament in 1695
(Stern, 2008, 74).
Between the 1692-1693 sessions and the 1695 session, opponents of
the Licensing act gained the support of John Locke. Locke focused
on the rights of readers to have “fairer and more correct” as well as
less expensive versions of the ancient classic books than were being
published under the current system. Booksellers were monopolizing
works that should be available cheaply and readers were forced to pay
for “excessively dear” editions of classic works. Locke also commented
on preprint censorship, the monopoly of the Stationer’s Guild, and
the exclusionary system of copy registration. Locke pointedly stated:
“Sometimes when a book is brought to the Company of Stationers, if
they think it may turne to account, they enter it as theirs” (Stern, 2008,
75). Locke argued for the creation of an expiration of copy holding
after a period of 50 years. Parliament rejected the bill to renew the
Licensing Act. Members proposed a new bill in its place that offered
no copy protection at all. The Stationers Guild opposed this version
of the bill. Another version of the bill that would have done nothing
other than renew the licensing act was proposed, but Edward Clarke,
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a politician and friend of Locke, protested that “[the publishers] enter
a Title to themselves, and their Friends, for what belongs to, and is
the Labour and Right of others” (Stern, 2008, 75).
The outcome of this legal debate was the elimination of pre-print li-
censing and the copy registration requirements of the Stationers Guild.
Members of Parliament proposed bills with limited terms of copy pro-
tection as Locke suggested. However, it was not until 1710 that the
Act of Anne replaced the expired Licensing Act. Members of the book
selling industry had called for author’s rights to benefit their own in-
terest, but this appealed to those who had opposed the renewal of the
Licensing Act. The Act of Anne called for a term of copy protection of
fourteen years. There was the possibility for a renewal of an additional
fourteen years if the author was still alive after the first fourteen years
(Stern, 2008, 76). The act allowed a twenty-one year term for works
already in print (Rose, 1988, 52). The publishing industry was able to
ignore these term limits, allowing perpetual copyright until 1774 when
the case of Donaldson v. Beckett occurred, the culmination of a series of
copyright dispute cases throughout the 18th century. The Act of Anne
was also the first time that authors in addition to publishers were able
to secure and hold copyrights (Rose, 1988, 57). Parliament initially
intended for author’s rights to prevent the Stationer’s Guild from con-
tinuing to monopolize valuable older copyrights. The Stationers would
later use author’s rights as one of their own arguments in attempting
to maintain perpetual control of works they had purchased.
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5. Copyright in the Theater
As copyright was being defined for literature, the theater was also
developing its relationship between authorship and production and the
distribution of printing rights. Generally, playwrights worked on com-
mission from the theatrical companies. Records of the Admiral’s Men,
a company owned by Phillip Henslowe, show that when a playwright
completed a play, Henslowe would pay the playwright a single fee. The
play would then enter the company’s repertory, and the company had
the rights to perform the play whenever they wished (Feather, 1992,
467). This implies a transfer of ownership to the theater company upon
sale. A case in which playwright Robert Greene was accused of selling
the same play twice, once to the Queen’s Men and again to the Ad-
miral’s Men, suggests that this sale of a play was a complete transfer
of all rights to the play (Feather, 1992, 471). The other predominant
English Theatre company, the Chamberlain’s Men (later King’s Men
under James I), was a joint stock company. William Shakespeare was
the principal shareholder of this company; after 1598, records show,
his plays belonged to the company (Feather, 1992, 468). This appears
to be an arrangement of convenience on the part of Shakespeare. A
playwright would often compose for either the company that employed
him or one in which he was a shareholder.
Booksellers did not publish plays written in this period very fre-
quently so the role of authorship usually did not come into play. Since
a performance (rather than a printed copy) conveyed the intellectual
good of a play, generally the sale of the play to the theater company was
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sufficient to deal with rights. While a theater company might produce
several hundred plays a decade between 1590 and 1605, only eighteen
plays published belonged to the Admiral’s Men; and from 1597 to 1612,
only thirty-two of the plays King’s Men were published (Feather, 1992,
468). The publication of plays introduced complications with rights.
Since the publishers who controlled the enforcement of anti-piracy laws
ran the Stationer’s Guild, they worked only to protect the interest of
publishers and not the theater companies who owned the plays. Many
corrupt texts of plays were printed. The text of the first edition of
Henry VI part 2 was mangled and not written entirely by Shakespeare.
Despite this, the publisher Thomas Millington entered the book into
the Stationers’ Register as normal, granting himself the rights to pub-
lish the work. Millington also had the power to transfer his rights,
presumably by sale, to Thomas Pavier (Feather, 1992, 468).
The Stationer’s Guild did not consider it piracy to publish a theatri-
cal work without the consent of the theater company. The book trade
considered piracy to have taken place only if the rights of a Stationers’
Company member were infringed, rights that could only be proven by
an entry in the Stationers’ register. This view offered the theatrical
companies no protection of the works that they had purchased from
playwrights, so they turned to their most powerful patron in hope of
obtaining help in the case of infringement. In 1619 the Court of Assis-
tants ordered “vppon a ler from the right hoble the Lo. Chamberleyne
It is thought fitt and so ordered That no playes that his Matyes do play
shalbe printed without consent of some of them” (Feather, 1992, 468).
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The Lord Chamberlain, patron of the theater company, decreed that
theater companies had the right to prevent publication of their works
if they so chose. However, interventions such as this were infrequent,
and in practice, plays functioned as all other books, intellectual goods
waiting for publishers to turn them into as profitable copies.
6. Copyrights in Music
The relationship among playwrights, theater companies, printers and
publishers was similar to the relationship among musical composers,
opera houses, printers and publishers. While the primary employers
of many composers were the Church and wealthy aristocratic patrons,
during the late 17th century and early 18th century there was a sub-
stantial amount of free-lance composing in both England and conti-
nental Europe. The most profitable compositions tended to be operas
sold to opera houses. Some local governments owned opera houses.
In other areas contributions from many wealthy citizens paid for the
construction of a local opera house. In both cases the owners dele-
gated management to an impresario. The impresario would contract
with composers to produce individual operas. The composer would
compose an opera and conduct the first performance, and in return
received an honorarium from the impresario for the effort (Scherer, 5,
2008).
A composer might write an opera while on retainer by local nobility,
but would still receive a lump sum honorarium for each composition.
Similarly, composers might be writing free-lance at the same time as
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receiving church employment or patronage from nobility. George Frid-
eric Handel received an annual stipend from the King of England while
acting as an impresario for his own operas and oratorios (similar to op-
eras but concerning sacred themes and less actor performance). Other
composers would moonlight as performers. Johann Sebastian Bach
performed in coffee houses in Leipzig. Franz Liszt and Niccolo Pa-
ganini both toured concert halls as virtuosos (Scherer, 5-6, 2008). As
more concert venues were organized, opportunities for free-lance per-
formance became more prevalent and composers began to finance and
promote many of these performances themselves.
As the amount of free-lance work increased, intellectual property
rights came into play in several ways. Laws acknowledged the right
for the composer to receive creative credit for writing a musical work.
The composer also had the right to allow or refuse performance of com-
positions for individual performers, and performances of works such as
operas and symphonies. They also had the right to publish their works.
Composers rarely claimed credit for the work of other composers, but
when they did and were discovered, public opinion became a means
of enforcement as the plagiarizing was often shunned and very unsuc-
cessful afterwards. A more common form of property right violation
was the performance of a work without giving the composer compensa-
tion. Ludwig von Beethoven combated this by increasing the difficulty
of his piano sonatas to a point where few besides himself could actu-
ally play them (Scherer, 7, 2008). Determining and protecting rights
to large works such as operas was more complex. Once a composer
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sold the opera score it became property of the impresario, in the same
way that once an author sold to a bookseller the copyright became the
bookseller’s property. The impresario had the right to make numerous
duplicates of the score for the numerous performers, and generally the
impresario had the rights to stage as many performances as he liked
without paying the composer further. An exception was Paris where a
1776 decree created a provision for compensation to the composer for
the first 40 performances (Scherer, 2008, 7).
The large number of copies of the score that were necessary to stage
a performance facilitated piracy of operas. The copyists hired to make
copies of the score would often make more than they needed and sell
these copies to other opera houses. This system of piracy flourished in
Italy which had less strict regulations than other areas and a multitude
of opera houses. The father of Wolfgang Mozart used this to gauge
reception to the opera Mitridate, stating: “The copyist is full of joy,
which in Italy is a very good omen, since, when the music pleases, the
copyist can sometimes make more money sending out and selling the
arias than the composer received for his composition”(Scherer, 2008,
7).
Pirates stole works for publication in addition to performance. A
composer might negotiate publication with publishers who would pay
an honorarium for the right to publish just as they would to any au-
thor. However, some publishers, notably John Walsh of London and
Probst of Leipzig, would obtain published works and create their own
editions without compensation. Copyists also found it lucrative to sell
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publishers extra copies they had made to prepare for a performance.
Copyists might sell to a pirate publisher, who could potentially publish
before the composer’s publisher could make a printing.
To combat this piracy, composers had several approaches. In gen-
eral, composers offered manuscripts to publishers with a reputation
for not pirating works. George Frideric Handel had the innovative ap-
proach of hiring his main pirate John Walsh as his official publisher.
Another practice was dividing manuscripts between several copyists so
that none had access to the full version. Composers closely supervised
copyists to make sure they did not create and steal extra copies. In
some cases composers took more drastic measures, such as Beethoven’s
confrontation with the Artaria house in Vienna, where he drew giant
“X’s”’ across their illegal copies of his work (Scherer, 2008, 8).
Musical copyright evolved alongside literary copyright. As with liter-
ary copyright, there was initially a system of privileges granting rights
to certain works. Composers or publishers could petition feudal lords
for the exclusive right to a musical work or works. In France the pub-
lishing house LeRoy and Ballard petitioned for rights, and received the
exclusive right to publish all musical works from 1551 to 1713. With-
out centralized government in many parts of the European continent
these privileges had little power outside the local area. The 1709 Act
of Anne, did not initially cover music, and the Crown continued to
grant privileges. However, a wealthy London composer, Johann Chris-
tian Bach, pushed for the extension of the Act of Anne to music, after
London publisher James Longman pirated his works. After a legal
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case in 1773, the Act of Anne expanded in 1777 to include musical
compositions. In 1852, Parliament extended the law further to include
performance rights in addition to publication rights (Scherer, 2008, 10).
7. Donaldson v. Beckett and other court cases
Many legal disputes throughout the eighteenth century centered on
abridgment. Copy holders did not bring suit against imitations, an-
thologies and revisions of works, but occasionally an abridgment would
include close to the entirety of the original work, leading to a dispute.
In 1741 Gyles v. Wilcox, a legal treatise borrowed from Sir Matthew
Hale’s Pleas of the Crown including “the greatest part thereof in the
very words thereof”. Although a “real and fair” abridgment was sup-
posed to include more than cosmetic changes, this abridgment was
allowed because of its abbreviated length not any creativity by the
abridger (Stern, 2008, 77). Other cases such as the 1761 case Dodsley
v. Kinnersley and the 1774 case Straham v. Newbery, were decided in
favor of the abridgments on the grounds of reduced length and saving
the readers time (Stern, 2008, 78).
The success of abridgments in court cases caused many defendants
facing infringement cases to claim they had made abridgments even
when this was clearly not true. In 1752 Tonson v. Walker concerned
the publication of a serialized form of Paradise Lost including nota-
tions from the Tonson edition in the defendant’s magazine. After a
failed argument that the work had fallen out of copyright, the defense
unsuccessfully argued that the work was an abridgment. Similarly, in
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Macklin v. Richardson, the initial argument was unrelated to abridg-
ment. The defense argued since Macklin had performed the work as a
play and had not published it he, “gave a right to any of the audience
to carry away what they could and make any use of it” (Stern, 2008,
78). Only after this argument failed the defense unsuccessfully argued
it was an abridgment. These cases show that much of the law’s view
of piracy centered on length. While the Tonson and Macklin cases
were viewed as piracy because there was no reduction in length, the
Gyles, Dodsley, and Strahan cases all consisted of direct copying, but
the court decided there was no infringement because the works were
reduced in length.
In 1774 the landmark case of Donaldson v. Beckett served to fur-
ther define the terms of copy protection set forth in the Act of Anne
and to further define the notion of “authorship”. Alexander Donald-
son was a Scottish bookseller accused of piracy for a reprint of James
Thomson’s The Seasons six years earlier. Thomas Beckett a London
bookseller, claimed the copyright (Rose, 1988, 51). The original work
was published in 1730, and with the twenty-eight years of protection
the Act of Anne granted, the statutory protection of the work expired
in 1758, ten years before Donaldson reprinted it. The nature of literary
property became the major issue in the case. Donaldson argued that
the statute was a maximum term of copyright, but Beckett and other
members of the Stationers Guild maintained that literary property was
a common-law right, existing perpetually. They argued that the Act
of Anne only existed to supplement the common-law right.
COPYRIGHT IN THE ARTS 23
This case garnered a significant amount of public attention, with
the Edinburgh Advertiser reporting: “No private cause has so much
engrossed the attention of the public, and none has been tried before
the House of Lords, in the decision which so many individuals were
interested”(Rose, 52, 1988). This case was a large step in the competi-
tion between the London publishers and booksellers in the Stationer’s
Guild and the booksellers from provincial regions, especially Ireland
and Scotland, whom the Guild’s regulations did not affect. Donaldson
v. Becket was the largest copyright dispute in the century, and received
a significant amount of attention from the press because its decision
would impact them directly.
Donaldson v. Becket also raised issues concerning the definition of
property and the changing role of the author in society. In the years
preceding the case, the increased demand for books began to change
how authors supported themselves. Authors had previously been sup-
ported by wealthy patrons who were looking to increase their own pres-
tige by retaining renowned writers. With the increase in book sales,
authors began to develop as independent professionals who supported
themselves by the initial sales of their manuscripts to publishers. Lord
Camden, a major figure in the House of Lords, opposed this trend and
all literary protection in general.
Glory is the Reward of Science, and those who deserve
it, scorn all meaner Views: I speak not of the Scribblers
for bread, who teize the Press with their wretched Pro-
ductions; fourteen Years is too long a Priviledge for their
perishable Trash. It was not for Gain, that Bacon, New-
ton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighted the World;
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it would be unworthy such Men to traffic with a dirty
Bookseller for so much as a Sheet of Letter-press. When
the Bookseller offered Milton Five Pounds for his Par-
adise Lost, he did not reject it, and commit his poem to
the Flames, nor did he accept the miserable Pittance as
the Reward of his Labor; he knew that the real price of
his work was Immortality, and that Posterity would pay
it (Rose, 54, 1988).
The idea of authorship was evolving. Authors had the power to
support themselves rather than being dependent on the favor of a noble.
Under the system of patronage authors did not have legal rights to their
work. Early printing privileges functioned as patronage from the crown
not as a legal copyright. A writer could own his physical manuscript
and then sell it to a bookseller or theater company, but the author
did not own the ideas. John Milton made several statements on the
matter of authorial ownership. One concerned “the just retaining of
each man his several copy (which God forbid should be gainsaid)”,
referring specifically to the Stationer’s Guild copyright. Later, Milton
spoke of the “human right, which commands that every author should
have the property of his own work reserved to him after death as well
as living” in response to King Charles I quoting Sidney’s Arcadia prior
to his execution (Rose, 1988, 55).
The thinkers of the Enlightenment defined the idea of intellectual
property alongside the idea of property itself. John Locke’s Two Trea-
tises of Government attempted to explain the creation of private prop-
erty as such: “Whatsoever then he [a man] removes out of the state
that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with,
and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
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property” (Rose, 1988, 56). Locke’s definition of property stated that it
was a natural right not a construction of the state. London booksellers
would use this argument to attempt to elevate the status of the author
as a creator and owner of property, so that the sale of manuscripts to
booksellers would transfer these property rights to themselves. The
booksellers believed that an author was entitled to what his labor had
produced, and that the work was the author’s absolute property. This
property was transferred to a bookseller by its sale, but continued to
be absolute and perpetual under its new owner, the bookseller. Book-
sellers filed most of the literary property court cases in the 18th century
in defense of author’s rights. However, the author’s themselves were
often absent from these cases (Rose, 1988, 58).
The court ruled that authors had a common law right to unpublished
works, but the process of publication transformed the common law right
into the statutory right that the Act of Anne protected for a finite
duration. However Donaldson v. Beckett and the other court cases
changed copyright from a license protecting the Stationer’s monopoly
to a full property right. While Donaldson v. Beckett itself did not
increase the power of copyright, the new language of property law that
it was framed in allowed for the expansion of the copyright term.
With the UK Literary Copyright Act of 1842, the fourteen to twenty-
eight year term specified under the Act of Anne, grew to a forty-two
year term, or the life of the author plus seven years, whichever was
longer. After the death of the author, the British government could is-
sue a compulsory license to publish works that would benefit the public
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(Khan 2005, 231). Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, copyright
expanded to include sheet music, maps, charts, sculptures, paintings,
photographs, drama, and some lectures in addition to books. However
there were strict guidelines. The owner needed to pay appropriate fees
on time. The owner also needed to send free copies of every edition to
the British Museum as well as to specific libraries including Trinity Col-
lege and the Bodleian. The government could only issue copyrights to
foreigners if they could show they were part of the British Empire; prior
publication in a foreign country or colony could prevent the grant of a
copyright (Khan 2005, 231). By 1878 a British Commission reporting
on the state of the copyright system felt that the statutory copyright
laws were “obscure, arbitrary, and piecemeal”’ and the confused state
of the common law compounded this trouble. British copyright law
underwent a major shift after the Berne Convention, a European copy-
right agreement. The Bern Convention brought British copyright law
more in line with Continental European practices, and the former Eng-
lish model found its closest parallel in the laws of the United States of
America (Khan 2005, 234).
8. Copyright in the United States
Prior to American independence, the American colonies generally did
not recognize copyright protection. Local publishers produced works
such as newspapers, almanacs and bills, which could saturate the mar-
ket during a first run printing. Medical and religious works were also
common, but the authors of these works wanted to maximize distribu-
tion of their work rather than maximize profit. The government dealt
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with literary works on an individual basis. John Ledyard and Noah
Webster eventually lobbied for general copyright statutes, and Con-
necticut passed the first American copyright law in 1783, titled “Act
for the encouragement of literature and genius” (Khan 2005, 234). In
order to be protected, books had to be offered at a reasonable price
and in sufficient quantities; the author also had to be a Connecticut
resident or the resident of a state with a law that reciprocated benefits
to Connecticut. The other original states enacted similar laws over the
next few years, the last being Georgia and New York in 1786.
In 1790 Congress passed a federal copyright statute. This statute re-
quired the submission of title of the work to the local district court and
a registration fee of 60 cents. When a work was registered the author
or proprietor submitting the work secured the right to print, publish,
and sell the work for a term of fourteen years, with a possible renewal
for another fourteen years. This statute only extended to American
works, stating: “nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to
prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within
the United States, of any map, chart book or books ... by any person
not a citizen of the United States”(Khan 2005, 235). This effectively
encouraged piracy of foreign works. In addition, this demonstrated
very clearly that despite strong copyright laws in one country, without
international agreements and recognition it was not possible to enforce
copyright laws abroad.
In 1802 Congress extended the copyright statute to include protec-
tion of art design. The 1802 act also required a copyright notice to be
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included on the work, and set a fine for infringement at one dollar per
copy, and false notice of copyright at one hindered dollars. By 1831 the
term of copyright was extended to twenty-eight years with a possible
renewal for fourteen more years, and it covered books, maps, charts,
musical compositions, prints, woodcuts, and engravings (Khan 2005,
257). New technology allowed for the duplication of many types of
works. In response to this Congress sought to expand and strengthen
the powers of copyright law.
While statistics on copyrights for this period are available it is diffi-
cult to obtain systematic information from them. There is a large range
of value in copyrights, a large range of types of works copyrighted, and
no presumption that the state of the art is improving over time (as
later works can often be quite derivative of more popular earlier works).
Analysis of aggregate copyright registrations would have to deal with
all of this. However litigation records can help examine the relation-
ship between copyright, markets, and social welfare (Khan 2005, 238).
They can also help to identify trends and show the evolution of legal
institutions concerning copyright.
Many copyright disputes in early nineteenth century America did
not reach court. The courts were very favorable to intellectual prop-
erty and enforcement was frequent. This atmosphere facilitated the
private settlement of disputes among the small publishing community
because the infringer did not want a lawsuit they had little chance of
winning. Copyright holders filed the most lawsuits in New York and
Pennsylvania. Due to its role as a center of publishing and commerce
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New York accounted for almost half of all copyright dispute cases in
the United States.
In contrast, the South had very low levels of copyright registrations,
book sales and marketing of print. In 1856, leading publishing company
Ticknor and Field’s sales in the city of Cincinnati were equal to its sales
in the entire South. In the sale year the amount of money Ticknor and
Fields spent advertising in New York City was higher than all the
Southern states combined. The South lacked extensive book markets,
mostly preferring English authors and purchasing few but expensively
bound books. Low literacy levels are one explanation for the lack of a
mass market for books in the South. Other arguments cite the lack of
railroad transportation and manufacturing for the state of the Southern
book trade (Khan 2005, 239). Railroad technology distributed book
further and more quickly than was possible in the past. This aided the
growth of larger publishing houses that could mass produce books in
one location then ship them throughout the country. Fewer railroads
in the South meant less access to books and other non-local printed
material. It is possible that this lack of exposure to print could have
then contributed to the lower literacy rates, which were a factor in the
low demand for books.
Unlike British copyright law, author’s rights were not at the fore-
front of the language surrounding copyright law or disputes in Amer-
ica. American copyright law only acknowledged the economic interest
that authors and artists had in their work, the same level of interest
it acknowledged for any legal copyright owner regardless of whether
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they were the creator of the work or not. The percentage of plaintiffs
in copyright disputes who were authors started low and continued to
fall throughout the nineteenth century. By the first decade of the 20th
century only 8.6 percent of plaintiffs in copyright cases were the cre-
ators of the disputed work (Khan 2005, 239). While British authors
did not often play a role in copyright disputes, the language of the au-
thor’s common law property rights to their creative labor was common
in these disputes. American copyright disputes forewent this language,
as the law explicitly considered copyright to be a commercial rather
than creative concern.
In American copyright law “the primary object [was] to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, thereby benefiting the public, and
as a means to that end, and as a secondary object, to secure exclu-
sive rights to authors”’ according to the court in Koppel v. Downing
1897 (Khan 242, 2005). Along these lines a 1909 report to congress
stressed that copyright legislation “under the terms of the constitution
is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings”
but again to promote progress and the public welfare. The 1909 re-
port also emphasized the importance of practical works over aesthetic
works. Copyrights of non-fiction works such as maps, atlases, treatises,
law reports dictionaries and data compilations outnumbered works of
fiction such as novels and poetry. Most court cases surrounded non-
fiction works as well. Some litigation focused on whether the protected
object was worthy of protection. In American Trotting Register Assn
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v. Gocher et al. a list of racehorses who had completed races in un-
der two minutes and thirty seconds was protected because it had been
“compiled at great expense and labor” (Khan 2005, 243). Pictures
in circus advertisements were also protected in Bleistein v. Donald-
son Lithographing Company, despite the dissenting opinion claiming
they did not promote “useful” arts. The value of compiled data sta-
tistics grew over the 19th century. In 1829 the publishers of a record
of current stock prices and review of the market state lost a case they
filed for infringement because the court felt daily stock prices did not
contribute to science. By the end of the century, this information was
highly valued, and in 1895 William B. Dana Company v. United States
Investor favored the plaintiff, the publisher of a financial paper (Khan
2005, 244). Again copyright was expanded as scientific advances gave
more value to certain intellectual goods.
Court decisions attempted to serve the general welfare rather than
protecting creators’ rights. The courts used the doctrines of first sale
and work for hire to do so. Under first sale copyright holders lose all
rights after they sell their works, preventing an artist or heirs claim-
ing remedy if the owners alter or distort works. This favored mar-
ket interactions, as the purchasers were able to gain more befit from
their purchases than in a system in which the purchaser is liable for
changes to a work. The principle of work for hire was widespread in-
cluding copyrights in art, drama, maps, and print. 1895’s Donaldson v.
Wright concerned a claim by Donaldson that Carroll Wright’s editing
of Donaldson’s report for the Census Bureau served to “emasculate”’
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his research. The court decided in favor of Wright and that once Wright
paid Donaldson for his work Donaldson lost rights to it. The decision
argued that otherwise similar problems could arise where employers
hired workers to prepare data and statistics (Khan 2005, 245).
While courts frequently sided with copyright owners, when they did
not it was usually due to improper process in filing copyright. Re-
quirements were strict: the law required perfectly worded notices in
the correct position, owners needed to pay proper fees on time, and
the owner needed to deposit copies to the Library of Congress on time.
These regulations served to prevent the registration of useless items.
Furthermore, the rule of compliance benefited copyright owners in that
it created a more efficient system in which proper registration lowered
the transaction costs of identifying owners. These regulations also al-
lowed litigation and enforcement to be clearer, protecting only works
that had followed the correct procedure. The requirement for deposit in
the Library of Congress also created a central repository of knowledge
that had a high public value (Khan 2005, 247).
Technological advances of the nineteenth century pressured the insti-
tution of copyright law, and forced it to change and evolve. Questions
arose concerning the scope of copyright. As the nineteenth century
progressed works in new mediums sought copyright. In 1865 Congress
extended copyright to photographs and negatives. However, since pho-
tography created a means to copy books, paintings and engravings, the
legal institutions were forced make decisions concerning the legality of
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such copies. Rossiter v. Hall concerned photographs of copyrighted en-
gravings of George Washington’s house which copyright law protected
against unauthorized reprints. The defendant argued that photogra-
phy had not been invented at the time of the statute so the law did not
prohibit photographs. The court rejected this argument ruling that the
photographs were unauthorized reprints (Khan 2005, 249).
The creation of the player piano and recording technology also raised
questions for copyright law. The law protected sheet music, but player
piano inputs were not quite analogous to sheet music. Similar ques-
tions arose when manufacturers of phonograph records created records
using copyrighted sheet music. In both of these cases the court did not
feel that copyright protection extended from sheet music to these new
technologies. In Kennedy v. McTammany the plaintiff owned the copy-
right to sheet music which the defendant had used to create a player
piano roll. The court could “find no decided cases which, directly or by
analogy support[ed] the position of the plaintiffs”’ (Khan 2005, 248).
The policy continued until 1909 when Congress revised copyright law
to give composers first rights to mechanical reproductions of their mu-
sic. After this recording, the law allowed production future recordings
with a fee of two cents per recording (Khan 2005, 248).
New technology created means of reproduction which often led to
infringement of rights. In response Congress expanded both the scope
of copyright laws and lengthened the term of copyright laws to main-
tain the value of copyright as the cost of reproduction and infringe-
ment fell. However, the declared purpose of American copyright law,
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to promote learning, continued to restrict these extensions. Ameri-
can terms of copyright were some of the shortest in the world, and
while copyright protected the way that the author presented ideas and
the expressions used, the ideas themselves were never protected under
copyright and remained in the public domain. The fair use doctrine
allowed for the use of some of a copyrighted work, just as the law al-
lowed some abridgment in England. The extent of what was fair use
was difficult to determine. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story cre-
ated a guideline that the court must “look to the nature and objects
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used,
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale or diminish
the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work” (Khan 2005,
250). The fair use doctrine allowed unauthorized use only when the
loss to the property owner was small, thus eliminating high transaction
costs that could arise over trivial matters. Fair use also promoted the
spread of knowledge which was of significant importance to the courts
and lawmakers. Extremely strict copyrights that did not allow fair use
would reduce scholarship, prohibit public access, and inhibit learning
and the Constitutional mandate to promote scientific progress (Khan
2005, 251).
9. The Berne Convention and the Internationalization of
Copyright law
During the 19th century, foreign publishers printed an increasing
number of pirated British works. French publishing houses supplied
British tourists with cheap reprints written in English. Belgian and
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American reprints were also common. Many of these reprints found
buyers among libraries, book clubs, and individual readers. Other con-
tinental European publishing houses focused on publishing local edi-
tions of British works. American newspapers also began to reprint
the entirety of some British novels (Seville 2006, 43). The 1842 Copy-
right Act contained provisions to address concerns of British publishers
about foreign reprints. The act imposed a 10 pound fine for import-
ing foreign reprints for sale or library lending. The government could
then seize and destroy these books. The act did not affect imports for
personal use. This act did not prove effective against foreign reprints,
and customs agents took little action to enforce it. The 1845 Customs
Act extending this system to British colonies, and the 1847 Foreign
Reprints Act were similarly ineffective (Seville 2006, 48-49).
In 1851, British and the French signed a treaty granting recipro-
cal protection of copyrights. Since many publishers of pirated reprints
were French, this was a major step in securing copyright protection for
British authors and publishers. The treaty extended to musical and
dramatic works, but did not cover “fair imitations or adaptations to
the English stage of any dramatic piece of musical composition pub-
lished in any foreign country”’ (Seville 2006, 52). This affected French
dramatists more so than British dramatists. Parliament used the treaty
with France as a model for later agreements with other nations. The
British Government signed conventions with Belgium in 1854, Spain in
1857, and the Italian state of Sardinia in 1860.
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A Congress met in Brussels in 1858 to discuss international copyright
issues. The Congress drafted an agreement “in favor of an international
and uniform copyright amongst all civilised nations, to be adopted even
when unattended with reciprocity, and of giving foreign authors equal
rights with natives, and without requiring the execution of any special
formalities beyond those required in the country of original publication”
(Seville 2006, 53). The agreement also favored temporary copyright
over perpetual, with a suggested term of the author’s life plus fifty
years. While the Congress did not enact any of these provisions, they
did open a broad international discussion. The 1878 Paris Congress
called for similar measures, but insisted on treating the author’s right
as a perpetual property right, rather than a temporary legal concession.
The congressed pushed the French Government to take more action to
create and international agreement. When the French did not act,
the Swiss Government began to initiate meetings leading to the Berne
Union in 1886 (Seville 2006, 59).
From 1883 until 1886 the Swiss Government hosted annual confer-
ences in Berne, with the purpose of finally creative a permanent inter-
national copyright law. These meetings led to a “Union for the pro-
tection of the rights of authors over their literary and artistic works”
(Seville 2006, 63). Countries could enter the Union at any time, by
agreeing to the current regulations of the Convention. The original
signatories of the Convention were Britain, Belgium, France, Germany,
Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia, as well as all
French and British colonies and possessions. These members revised
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their domestic laws to reflect the Berne agreement. In 1896, a revision
to the convention took place in Paris, and again in Berlin in 1908. The
Berlin revision resulted in a minimum copyright term of the author’s
life plus fifty years, the revision assimilated translation right into re-
production rights (Seville 2006, 74-75). While the Berne convention
and its revisions proved successful in codifying international copyright
law. Because of its stance on copyright protection the United States
failed to qualify for admission until 1988.
Until the late 19th century the United States government maintained
the same stance on foreign copyrights that it had in 1790. The laws
and legal system continued to encourage international copyright piracy.
American self-interest favored piracy, because Europeans had little de-
mand for American cultural products, while American’s had high de-
mand for European culture. International copyright agreements would
have hurt American employment and manufacturing, and there were
little reciprocal benefits from European recognition of American copy-
right. American printers, publishers, and booksellers, benefited from
piracy of European works. High tariffs on imports or European works,
encouraged the local printing of pirated versions. American authors
with international reputations such as Henry Wadsworth Longfellow
and Louisa May Alcott, lobbied to end this practice. However coali-
tions of paper producers, books binders, typographical unions, printers,
publishers, and others associated with the book trade spoke out in favor
of the piracy, and the business that it created (Khan 2005, 259).
38 KEVIN LIFTIG
The 1891 Chace Act (or International Copyright Act) finally granted
copyright to selected foreign residents. However, the Act granted signif-
icant concessions to the American book trade. It required publication
in the United States either before or simultaneously with the author’s
home country. The Chace Act also required publisher to print all inter-
national works either in the United States, or with typesetting plates
manufactured in the United States. These restrictions still prevented
the United States from joining the newly formed Berne Convention
(Khan 2005, 260).
10. Technological challenges to copyright in the
Twentieth Century
During the Twentieth Century, the duration of American copyright
expanded several times. The Copyright Act of 1909, doubled the pre-
vious term of copyright from 1790. Authors could copyright works for
a term of twenty-eight years, with a renewal of an additional twenty-
eight years. The 1976 Copyright Act extended protection to either 75
years for corporate works, or the life of the author plus fifty years. The
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act extended all copyrights for twenty
years, corporate copyrights now have duration of 95 years after pub-
lication or one hundred and twenty years after creation, whichever is
earlier, and private works are the life of the author plus seventy years.
The government created these extensions to protect copyright as tech-
nology for duplication advanced. Many in the public saw 1998 Act
as a service to corporations going so far as to colloquially call it the
“Mickey Mouse Protection Act”’ due to the fact the popular cartoon
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mouse owned by Disney would have entered the public domain in 2003,
without the intervention of the Act.
Early in the twentieth century, the creation of radio broadcast tech-
nology led to conflict between radio stations and copyright owners.
Holders of music copyright formed a collective licensing society the
ASCAP, to deal with licensing performance rights to radio stations.
Radio stations refused to purchase licenses on the grounds that their
broadcasts were not public performance for profit which would have
been an infringement under the 1909 copyright statute. Radio stations
argued “they did not charge to hear the music” and since broadcasts
were received in listeners homes, they were not “public”. They even
argued that they were helping the music industry by promoting sales
of sheet music and sound recordings of songs. Courts still considered
these transmissions to be public, as radio stations were broadcasting
to the public even though distance separated the listeners over many
households (Ginsburg 2001, 1621). In a case concerning hotels rebroad-
casting radio transmissions throughout the hotel over loudspeakers Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis remarked “While this [from of exploitation] may
not have been available before the development of radio broadcasting,
the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts
to five full protection to the monopoly of public performance for profit
which Congress has secured to the composer” (Ginsburg 2001, 1621).
The twentieth century had tremendous advancement in duplication
and production technology. Economically feasible photocopying be-
came available early in the century. This technology opened piracy
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and free riding to the general public. Prior to photocopy technol-
ogy, the average consumer could not duplicate books at a cost smaller
than the prices of books themselves. While pirates who created cheap
reprints possessed technology to do to this, there were substantial fixed
costs in purchasing the equipment to do so. By 1934 Robert Binkley,
the Chairman of a Joint Committee on Materials for Research antic-
ipated “within the next year film copies of books will be very much
cheaper than the normal prices of the books themselves”’ (Adelstein
1985, 256). Binkley preemptively negotiated with W. W. Norton, Pres-
ident of the National Association of Book Publishers, creating a “Gen-
tleman’s Agreement” to ensure that photocopying for scholarly excepts,
previously transcribed by hand, would not be considered a violation of
copyright. Duplication for profit or as a substitute for purchase was for-
bidden, but single photocopies “in lieu of loan ... or in place of manual
transcription and solely for the purpose of research” were recognized
as fair use (Adelstein 1985, 227).
The invention of the Xerox process in 1950, made copying faster, eas-
ier and cheaper. Publishers attempted to use new printing technology
to combat the increases in copying technology. Since early Xerox ma-
chines could not duplicate certain colors, publishers printed some copy-
righted material with special dyes containing these colors. They hoped
this would make copies illegible. However Xerox technology continued
to improve moving past this limitation (Adelstein 1985, 228). Xerox
machines spread quickly, and by 1970 thousands of libraries possessed
them. Large research libraries subscribed to thousands of scholarly
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journals. With the availability of free duplication technology, libraries
became secondary producers of intellectual goods. Xerox technology
allowed libraries to “lend”’ an infinite number of copies with no lim-
itation on length of time. Duplication at libraries offered permanent
access to knowledge and ideas for significantly less cost than it did for
users to acquire the original works. Libraries resisted attempts by pub-
lishers to establish royalty plans to charge on a per page copied basis,
citing the benefits to research and knowledge (Adelstein 1985, 229).
The original language of copyright that promoted the advancement of
science above concerns of authors or publishers rights, would support
this argument.
Library duplication led the Williams and Wilkins Company, a pub-
lisher of medical journals, to sue the National Institute of Health and
the National Library of Medicine for infringement. This resulted in the
1973 case Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States. The Court of
Claims decided in favor of the United States libraries, using histori-
cal precedent to back their decision. The decision cited the fact that
Library of Congress permitted the photography of copyrighted works
for personal use from 1906 to 1939. They also cited Binkley’s “Gentle-
man’s Agreement” of 1935, and the fact that publishers had not sought
to contest copying for a significant period of time (Adelstein 1985, 229).
The fact that photocopying by libraries of entire articles
was done with hardly any (and at most very minor) com-
plaint, until about 10 or 15 years ago, goes a long way to
show both that photoduplication cannot be designated as
infringement per se, and that there was at least a time
when photocopying, as then carried on, was ‘fair use’
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... [T]he libraries can properly stand on the proposition
that they photocopied articles for many years, without
significant protest, and that such copying was generally
accepted until the proliferation of inexpensive and im-
proved copying machines, less than two decades ago, led
to the surge in such duplication. The question then be-
comes whether this marked increase in volume changes
a use which was generally accepted as ‘fair use’ into one
which has not become ‘unfair’ (Adelstein 1985, 229).
While the majority cited historical precedent, the decision to al-
low Xerox copying in libraries seemed to be a major change in the
treatment of copyright. While the law historically allowed copying in
libraries, this decision appeared to allow libraries to exist as full scale
secondary producers of academic journals. However in some ways, the
ideas from Binkley’s Gentleman’s Agreement refute this. Binkley ar-
gued that photocopying was not a substitute for purchase of the articles
themselves, but a replacement for time consuming hand copying and
transcription. The consumers of the Xeroxed journal articles would not
necessarily have purchased the journals directly from the publishers to
begin with. In this case, the Xerox process may not have been a substi-
tute for purchase, but rather it merely reduced the number of trips to
the library and amount of time spent copying. The decision did not af-
fect the purchases that libraries made from publishers and the benefits
this system had to the public potentially encourage libraries to stock
more copies of journals. Xerox technology served to aid research and
the spread of knowledge, and in that sense it helped libraries improve
their functions.
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Like Xerox technology, home video recording technology allowed
users to duplicate intellectual goods, in this case television broadcasts.
In 1976 Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions, began a
legal campaign against the Sony Corporation, the maker of the popular
Sony Betamax video recorder. The film studios targeted Sony due to
the difficulty and costs involved in tracking down and suing each indi-
vidual who used the technology. At this the United States Congress was
finishing the 1976 revision of copyright law and would be hesitant to
include new protections for the film industry, so a legal course seemed
to be the best option for the Studios. The Studios sought to create
a royalty scheme for the sale of each Betamax, to offer compensation
for the use of their protected works. After several reversed decisions
in lower courts, the case made its way to the Supreme Court as Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios in 1984 (Adelstein 1985, 231). In a
5-4 majority, the court decided in favor of Sony. The majority opinion
stated that contributory infringement could not be found for a tech-
nology that is “ capable of substantial noninfringing uses” (Adelstein
1985, 232). They also decided the practice of recording a program for
the purposes of viewing it once later and then erasing it, was fair use as
it did not harm the Studios (Adelstein 1985, 232). The dissent felt the
majority should have looked into the impact of the videotape recorder
on new markets for television programming, not just the existing mar-
kets. However, ultimately the Studios did benefit from this technology
as the video rental market developed and boomed throughout the late
eighties and the nineties (Ginsburg 2001, 1624).
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In 1992, Congress created the Audio Home Recording Act to pro-
tect the music industry from digital audio recording media. Copyright
owners sought to avoid a repeat of the Betamax decision by making
a distinction between analog and digital copying. They argued digi-
tal recording would harm sales of authorized recordings, because they
could make perfect multigenerational copies of recordings, where as
analog copies sacrificed quality for each step they were removed from
the original. By working with Congress and not calling for a ban on
digital recorders, the copyright holders were able to implement some
restrictions. The law permitted distribution of digital audio recording
devices only if a statutory royalty was paid for each piece of equipment
sold, and the devices could only record a first generation copy. Con-
ceding the right to make private digital copies, the copyright owners
gained control over the copying of all subsequent generations through
the creation of the Serial Copy Management System. The 1992 act
mandated this technology and it prevented further copying from any
copy made of a recorded work. To prevent a technological “arms race”
to create SCMS circumvention techniques, Congress prohibited SCMS
breaching technology from being sold (Ginsburg 2001, 1628).
The 1998 lawsuit RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, was a case in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America sought to prevent the manufacture and sale of the Rio
portable MP3 player. The Court interpreted the statutory copyrights
very narrowly, because they felt the copyright owners were attempting
to stop technological progress. The RIAA claimed the Rio violated
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the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act, because it was a “digital audio
recording device” that did not incorporate the Serial Copy Manage-
ment System required. The initial court decision stated that Diamond,
the makers of the Rio might be obliged to pay a statutory royalty for
each machine sold, but that SCMS was unnecessary because the device
could not make serial recordings. When both sides appealed the Ninth
Circuit held that the Rio was not a “digital audio recording device”
and did not have to pay royalties or incorporate SCMS as it did not
fall under the statute at all(Ginsburg 2001, 1625).
Technological progress altered the balance of control between users
and distributors. The photocopier made it possible for consumers to
acquire intellectual goods without purchase or borrowing. Audio and
video recording allowed users to view and hear works which had only
been available through scheduled broadcasts. These technologies al-
lowed the public to access the intellectual good they wanted, not what
the media chose to broadcast (Ginsburg 2001, 1616). The invention of
new technology can lead to two categories of legal challenges. In some
cases, the technology creates new methods to distribute copyrighted
material, and the owners seek to benefit from the new technology and
“get in on the action” so to speak. The new technology might compete
with the previous modes of distribution. An example of this is the
radio broadcast of copyrighted music. Some saw radio broadcasts as
a substitute to physical music records. However, the owners of musi-
cal copyright were able to use radio technology to gain popularity and
profit from its use of their works. The willingness of the music industry
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to work with the government in the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act
also appears to be an example. The other category of legal challenge
occurs when copyright owners seek to prevent the spread of new tech-
nology to the public, rather than use it. The Xerox, Betamax, and
Rio MP3 player disputes fall under this category. While the first type
of case was usually favorable to copyright owners, this second type of
case was not (Ginsburg 2001, 1619). In each case legal institutions
took new technology into account, even requiring the use of protective
technology in the case of SCMS. The approach of the copyright holder
towards new technology, either to utilize or to seek to prohibit, had
an effect on how the legal institutions responded. The law sought to
allow science to continue to progress, and benefit the general public at
the same time as protecting copyright, royalty arrangements and other
agreements were more conducive to this end than banning technology.
11. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the
Internet
The Internet affected copyright differently than previous technolog-
ical advances. Rather than a discrete innovation, the Internet was
a whole new system of communication and data transmission. Con-
gress’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act did not focus on consoling
copyright owners, but to promote a new exercise of copyright and to
adjust copyright rules in response to the new technology before major
issues could arise. The DMCA focused on both the new technologies
impact on old markets, and the role of the new technology in creating
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and spreading new markets. The DMCA protects measures protect-
ing access to copyrighted work against circumvention, and prohibits
devices designed to circumvent measures protecting copyright owners
against copying, adaption, distribution, and public performance or dis-
play. Fair use and other defenses remained available in regards to the
second provision, but no such defense was available for circumvention
methods to access copyrighted material (Ginsburg 2001, 1631).
The existence of access controls made digital media significantly dif-
ferent from earlier technology, because these access controls could pre-
vent the user from accessing the good more than a certain amount,
could prohibit making private copies more than a set number of times,
or prevent users from placing the good on multiple computers. The
legal protection of these access controls give the copyright holder di-
rect access to the user, and they can control how much the user can
experience the good (Ginsburg 2001, 1632).
Did the DMCA’s protection against circumvention technology re-
strict the expansion of science and new technologies too much? Or was
it an appropriate protection of copyright, depending on the future of
electronic commerce via the Internet? If electronic copies eventually
eliminate the market for hard copies, then the DMCA measures were
merely a preemptive institutional change to maintain the incentives to
create and distribute intellectual property, just as the law has being do-
ing for centuries. The DMCA happened to be one of the only measures
that adjusted the institution before the new technology took full hold.
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In this case, the prevention of circumvention technology fulfills the in-
tended purpose of the law, to disable unauthorized copying (Ginsburg
2001, 1634).
However, the DMCA allows copyright owners to control access to a
work in general, rather than just a copy of the work. This limits use
of the work even when it has been lawfully acquired, and violates the
idea of “first sale”’ which had protected the right of the purchaser to do
what they wanted with intellectual property they acquired, including
resale on the secondhand market when they do not wish to access
the work any further. Access controls could be persistent, meaning
a user might need to enter a password for each use. Access controls
could also be used to place a “thin”’ copyright, a copyright protecting
the arrangement of the work and not the work itself, on material in
the public domain. This would give owners significantly more control
over users (Ginsburg 2001, 1635). To prevent copyright owners from
exploiting access technology, Congress gave the Librarian of Congress
authority to declare what classes of works that access controls would
compromise non-infringing uses. The Copyright Office has the ability
to create more exempted classes of works, should copyright holders go
too far in preventing access to certain works (Ginsburg 2001, 1636).
The Internet also challenge existing institutions by providing an envi-
ronment where individuals could share digital goods across the world.A
and M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. was one of the most significant
court cases against Internet file sharing. The Napster website facili-
tated the copying and distribution of MP3 files from one users hard
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drive to another, by peer to peer “Music Share” software, and host-
ing a central searchable directory to access these works. The lawsuit
reached as far as the Ninth Circuit. The court concluded that the peer
to peer file sharing technology offered a valuable means of communi-
cation and should not be jeopardized, but found a distinction between
Napster’s system architecture and Napster’s conduct relating to its op-
erations, finding the later to be in violation of copyright. The district
court distinguished this from the Betamax case Napster was unable to
demonstrate is was capable of commercially significant non-infringing
uses, and was aware that its users were copying pirated works. The
Ninth Circuit Court decided that the peer to peer technology did and
could have more future non-infringing uses and they found Napster to
be violating copyright because artists and music companies had no-
tified Napster that specific infringing material was available through
their system. The Court affirmed that copyright owners bear the bur-
den of notifying Napster, or other systems, when infringing files exist
in their system. Once notification occurs, it is Napster’s responsibil-
ity to exclude these files. In the Betamax case, once retailers sold a
Betamax machine, Sony had no way to determine if users infringed
copyrights with the technology. In the Napster case the same tech-
nology that allowed users to search for copyrighted material, allowed
copyright holders to search and discover if infringement was occurring
and to notify the file sharing services to remove the material (Ginsburg
2001, 1641).
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In their 1985 paper, Adelstein and Peretz created a model in which
intellectual goods function similarly to a public good. They imagined a
world in which memory is perfect for all individuals, and all individuals
can read each other’s minds at will. As with a public good, the idea’s
creator has no way to limit distribution, since customers can reproduce
the good without cost. Supply is perfectly elastic and the price would
always be zero, since duplication is costless. The creator of the idea
would not be able to exclude anyone from accessing the idea, allowing
the possibility of unlimited free riding; so in this model there is no
chance to recapture production costs (Adelstein, 1985, 218). There-
fore, in this model, there would be no pecuniary incentive to create;
the only incentive to create would come from a desire to create and
share. In this model, intellectual goods would not entirely behave like
public goods. While individuals can usually obtain public goods only
from the good’s producer, this model would allow individuals to obtain
goods from anyone who has used the good(Adelstein, 1985, 218). Intel-
lectual goods in this model have a marginal cost of zero to supply the
good to additional customers, as is true for public goods; however, the
marginal benefit to a consumer for consuming the same intellectual
good multiple times is also zero because of perfect recall. Although
Adelstein and Peretz’s model had no real world equivalent when they
wrote their article, peer to peer file-sharing mirrors their model, al-
though it is generally not the original creator of the intellectual good
who introduces the good into the file-sharing network.
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The Internet has also served to store a vast amount of human knowl-
edge. In 2004, Google began to digitize works in the public domain and
some works under private copyright through partnerships with libraries
and authors, reaching seven million searchable books by October 2008.
Before Google embarked on this project many works were out of print
but still under copyright. Individual could only obtain many of these
works through libraries, or with luck, at a used books store. After
reaching a settlement with publishers, Google Book Search project be-
gan to digitize most books published in the United States. This project
enables the public to access and purchase works that would not have
been otherwise available, and authors and publishers to receive revenue
for out of print works that are purchased (Lemley 2009, 2). This system
takes advantage of the scope of the Internet to distribute a widespread
and useful service benefiting users, copyright holders, and the advance-
ment of learning and science, apparently finding the balance that legal
institutions have often sought.
12. Conclusion
There has very rarely been one definitive copyright. Copyright laws
change and develop with each generation. Lawmakers and courts seek
to maintain balance the rights of copyright owners to protect their work
and to collect rent from its use, with the promotion of the general utility
of the public and the advancement of science. Technology changes this
balance forcing legal institutions to change and adapt to new methods
of production and duplication, such as printing presses, photography,
Xerox, and video and music recorders, and new methods of distribution
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and access, such as radio and television broadcasting and the Internet.
Therefore most changes in the institution of copyright favor stronger
protections to combat the affects of new technology. The strength of
copyright laws have varied between countries. The Enlightenment idea
of human rights emphasized the rights of the owner in European law.
However, the language in the American Constitution concerning copy-
right and intellectual property emphasized the advancement of science
and knowledge in the general public of the United States, and offered
no protection to foreigners. As new technology was created throughout
the 20th century and legal institutions changed, American copyright
law began to offer more protection to the copyright holder. Congress
created the additional protections and extensions to copyright holders
to balance the effect of new technology. These twentieth century copy-
right reforms brought American copyright protection in line with the
international community. America finally joined the Berne Convention
in 1988, one hundred years after it was created.
With the rise of the Internet, copyright law is poised to continue to
grow and evolve. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act attempts to
anticipate problems that could arise, but no law is clairvoyant. On-
line business models for distribution of intellectual goods have proved
successful for many companies. The success of Apple’s iTunes store
showed that customers would pay to legally acquire inexpensive digital
music, even in the wake of file sharing from Napster and other peer
to peer networks. Google books search has adopted adopted a similar
model to iTunes, allowing users to pay a small fee to acquire the work
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they want from a large database. The corporations working with these
distribution models have been successful both financially and legally
through their willingness to work with and promote new technology,
rather than seeking to prevent it.
Arguments for or against copyright laws can be generalized into two
specific camps. One one hand there have been those who favor expan-
sion of copyright to encompass all present and future creative works to
allow producers to collect as much value as they can from the intellec-
tual goods they are helping to produce. On the other hand there are
the minimalists who favor only enough protection to provide creators
continued incentive to create. These two positions are diametrically
opposed. As can be seen from the history in this paper, any revision
in copyright law must favor one position over the other. Generally,
changes in the law favors those who would like a more comprehen-
sive copyright system because the law responds to the creation of new
technology which undermines existing copyright. While some new tech-
nology such as special inks and digital rights management software has
served to protect intellectual property, the vast majority of new print-
ing and copying technology facilitates the duplication and distribution
of intellectual goods to individuals with little or no rent returning to
the producer. Over the past century copyright terms have been ex-
tended repeatedly in the United States, in response to an increase in
the availability and quality of duplication technology.
Christopher Yoo’s approach to this debate discussed earlier uses the
concept of the “Samuelson Condition” to imply that, when producers
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can vary the quantity of a public good they produce, producers only
need to appropriate the marginal benefit, rather than total benefit
resulting from increases in production. Since this would mean the
consumer would also reap some benefit Yoo’s approach seems to reach
a middle ground that is more optimal than the strict legal trade-offs of
the current system.
Currently intellectual goods are considered to be similar to pub-
lic goods, in that they are both non-excludable and non-rival. How-
ever, non-excludability is not necessarily always a characteristic of pub-
lic goods. While a lighthouse may be seen as a quintessential non-
excludable public good, Conley and Yoo suggest that the lighthouse
could install a lamp outside the visible spectrum and give only ships
that had subscribed to its service the equipment to detect the broad-
cast (Conley and Yoo, 2009, 1806). They use this to suggest that
non-excludability is technological, rather than intrinsic to the concept
of a public good. When applied to intellectual goods and copyrighted
material this example is similar to how digital rights management tech-
nology is being used.
Similarly, the non-rivalry of intellectual goods may not be absolute
either. Non-rivalry is traditionally modeled by assuming that once the
author incurs the fixed costs necessary to produce the first copy of
a work, the work can be costlessly reproduced an infinite number of
times. This assumption implies the marginal cost of additional copies is
zero. Since the social benefits of producing additional copies outweigh
the social costs when the marginal cost is zero, there is an economic
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argument to produce more. Efficient pricing sets price equal to mar-
ginal cost, which in this case is zero. A price of zero would prevent
fixed costs from being recovered, while charging prices greater than
marginal cost would create a deadweight loss (Conley and Yoo, 2009,
1807). Here once again is the ever present tension between produc-
ers and consumers in regards to copyright law. Conley and Yoo point
back to Samuelson’s approach, stating “institutional mechanisms that
permit public goods to be priced at marginal cost are not sufficient to
solve the problem” (Conley and Yoo, 2009, 1808).
Conley and Yoo conclude that when goods are divisible (which means
producers can vary the quantity of a public good they produce), pro-
ducers only need to capture the sum of the marginal benefits that
consumers derive from the public good, allowing consumers to retain
some of the surplus. However when public goods are indivisible, as
is often the case with intellectual goods since one can either write a
book or not write a book, a system where producers appropriate the
entire surplus is a sufficient condition to achieve an optimum solution,
but is not a necessary condition. Other solutions that do not require
perfect price discrimination could exist. In these alternative equilibria
consumers could potentially retain some of the surplus if the “producer
is able to charge individualized prices calibrated to the precise benefit
each consumer derives from the public good” (Conley and Yoo, 2009,
1829).
The information necessary to achieve the price discrimination that
Conley and Yoo discuss, requires more complex models, and makes
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results difficult obtain without comprehensive information on the spe-
cific nature of demand for intellectual goods. Since the system where
producers appropriate the entire surplus is an optimum for producers,
there does not appear to be incentive for the producers themselves to
attempt to use any information they have concerning consumer demand
to create the models that Conley and Yoo discuss. It also does not ap-
pear likely that a change in the system will arise through a change
in legal institutions. As this paper has shown, changes in the copy-
right law have been largely reactive, and have been driven by disputes
that arise through increases in duplication technology and increases
in the ability of individuals to pirate and distribute works. Although
producers have found technological solutions (such as digital rights
management software) to the the problem of non-excludability, new
technological developments still largely favor those who wish to breach
copyright. As such, there does not appear to be any momentum for
legal institutions to search for alternative optimal solutions that give
more favor to consumers. Instead it seems likely that legal institutions
will continue to respond to technological increases with laws that im-
pose tighter copyright restrictions. There has not, and will not be, a
definitive copyright law. Copyright law will continue to change and
adapt to advances in technology and the needs of the times.
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